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An experiment was run to examine the main factors determining choices
among bets in gambling situations. In the first experiment, where all the
bets had an equal expected value, a specific set of preferences among
probabilities was observed. The most important of these is a preference
for a 4/8 probability of winning and an avoidance of a 6/8 probability of
winning. In the second experiment, where all bets had differing expected
values, it was shown that both preferences for bets with higher expected
values and preferences among probabilities influence subjects' choices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
People in gambling situations do not make choices in such a way to
maximize their expected winnings or minimize their expected losses,
although there is reason to assume that these are their goals. Several
theories have been offered to explain these facts, and experiments have
been done to test the theories.
A. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR
Most dictionary definitions of risk center around the phrase "chance
of loss." Accordingly, the magnitudes of both probabilities and losses
enter into the determination of the amount of risk which a given course
of action entails.
A number of investigators have been concerned with willingness to
gamble on ability tests as reflective of general risk taking tendencies.
When Cronbach (1946) discussed the types of response sets that contaminate
test scores, he mentioned several that have been of particular interest to
researchers seeking objective measures of risk taking. These are: (1) the
tendency to guess on a test item when uncertain about the answer rather
than omit it (Cronbach labeled this the gambling responses set) ; (2) the
tendency to include many items in a given category when no limit is imposed
(the inclusiveness set); (3) the tendency to answer rapidly on time tests,
attempting to compensate for committing a greater number of errors by
completing more items (the speed vs. accuracy set).

Other potential risk-taking indices include measures of extremity of
judgment in situations where greater extremity affords the possibility of
a greater magnitude of error and judgmental confidence or certainty. This
might be indicative of an individual's biases in perceiving probabilities
of success and failure. Brim and Hoff (1957) investigated the Desire for
Certainty Test in which subjects were asked to complete sentences of the
form "The chances that such-and-such an event will occur are about in
100." After making his probability estimate the subject rated his confi-
dence in that estimate. Scores obtained were the mean confidence rating
and mean deviation from the most conservative probability estimate (which
is 50%). Wallach and Kogan (1959) studied sex differences on the Desire
for Certainty Test. They found that for items in which persons were any-
thing less than quite sure, men's probability estimates were more extreme
than those of women. For items on which subjects were very sure, women's
probability estimates were more extreme. They concluded that women were
highly certain less frequently than men, but when they were very certain
they were willing to take large risks.
More indices of risk-taking behavior are probability and variance
preference measures (probability preferences being the subject of my
experiment). Edwards (1954 b, 1954 d) pioneered in the study of preferences
among gambles differing in probability of winning and losing. He observed
that subjects had definite preferences for betting at some probability
levels rather than at others.
Coombs and Pruitt (1960) noted that a bet with probability P to win A
dollars and probability Q to win B dollars can be viewed as a probability
distribution over outcomes of money whose mean or expected value is
P(A) + Q(B), and whose variance is PQ(A-B)
. Coombs and Pruitt argued that

in addition to probability preferences, variance preferences are indicative
of an individual's utility for risk. The variance of a bet reflects the
amount of deviation of its possible outcomes from the average amount of
money to be obtained by playing the bet. For example, a bet offering
even odds to win or lose five dollars has a larger variance than a bet
offering even odds to win or lose one dollar, although both have an
expected value of zero dollars.
Coombs and Pruitt (1960) had subjects choose among pairs of zero
expected value bets differing in probability of winning but with variance
held constant and vice versa. They found sizeable individual differences
in probability and variance preferences. Variance preferences were less
stable than probability preferences and in general, subjects preferred
greater variance for bets which contained their favorite probabilities.
It should be noted that for bets with two outcomes and zero expected
value, such as those used by Coombs and Pruitt, alternatives with high
probabilities of winning carry with them the possibility of a large loss.
Similarly, though long shot bets afford greater opportunities to lose, the
amount of money that may be lost is relatively small. Therefore, there is
no unequivocal hypothesis concerning the relation between probability
preferences among these bets and high risk taking. The magnitude of risk
which persons perceive in these bets is an open question.
Additional studies support the notion that variance preferences exist
and are consistent for a given individual within a particular risk-taking
task.
Atkinson (1957) has stimulated much work related to the study of
probability preferences. The basis for Atkinson's risk-taking model came
from the relationship that McClelland (1956 b, 1958) found between need for

achievement and preference for moderate probabilities of success in ring
toss, level of aspiration, and vocation choice. The model involves six
variables: the subjective probability (i.e., expectancy) of success (P ),
the subjective probability of failure (P^) , the incentive value of success
(I ) , the (negative) incentive value of failure (If), the achievement
motive (M ) , and the motive to avoid failure (Mf ) . Incentive values and
subjective probabilities are assumed to be inversely and linearly related.
The variables are combined multiplicatively in the following equation:
Resultant Motivation = (M s x P s x I s ) + (Mf x Pf x -If). The Resultant
Motivation function has a maximum at Ps - 0.5 if M s is greater than Mf,
and minimum at P s = 0.5 if Mf is greater than M s . Thus Atkinson predicts
that individuals in whom M s is greater than Mf will prefer tasks with
intermediate P s , while persons dominated by Mf will prefer tasks in which
P s is extremely high or low.
Atkinson found support for the model from the fact that subjects with
high M s preferred to shoot from moderately difficult distances in a shuffle-
board game while high Mf persons preferred the extremely easy or difficult
distances. He also obtained probability preferences among bets in a make-
believe gambling situation. Subjects were asked to make choices such as
"Would you prefer odds of 1/6 to win $18.00 or 4/6 to win $4.50?" Expected
value was held constant but variance decreased monotonically as probability
of winning increased. Subjects with low Mg preferred extreme probabilities
but the preferences of subjects with high M were evenly distributed across
all probabilities. Scodel, Minas, and Ratoosh (1959) related probability
preferences in a real gambling situation to achievement motivation and
other selected personality variables. Variance was not controlled. Sub-
jects preferring intermediate probabilities of success and intermediate
payoffs scored highest on M Sj supporting Atkinson' s theory.
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Risk taking behavior appears to be multidimensional in nature. It
has subjective components and is susceptible to a variety of other
influences. Therefore, the results of the following experiment should be
viewed in this light. My experiment will identify several phenomena
involved in preferences among bets and is not meant to supply conclusive





The decisions people make in gambling situations are psychologically
interesting because they are motivated human responses and because they
are primarily controlled by simple numerical properties of the stimulus
situation. In any situation in which a person must decide whether or not
to bet on the occurrence of a future event, two sets of variables will
probably be crucial in controlling his behavior: the probability of
winning or losing, and the amounts which can be won or lost. If the
amount of money (or any other measurable commodity) which can change hands
for each possible outcome of a bet is multiplied by the probability of
that outcome, the sum of these products over all possible outcomes is
called the expected value (EV) of the bet. The expected value is the
amount the gambler should expect to win (or lose) on each play of the bet.
If a bet has a positive expected value, the gambler will in the long run
profit by taking it. If it has a negative expected value, he will in the
long run lose by taking it. If it has an expected value of zero, he is
just as likely to win as to lose in the long run. The following two
experiments were designed to identify variables which determine choices
among bets which are constant in expected value (experiment I) and which
differ from one another in expected value (experiment II).
11

A. CONSTANT EXPECTED VALUE (CEV) EXPERIMENT
The gambling in this experiment was done with seven decks of cards.
Each deck was separated into suits, and eight cards of each suit (A, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8) were put in 28 separate piles of eight cards each.
Each subject was assured that the top card of each pile was equally likely
to be an A, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8. During the experiment no subject
expressed doubts about the honesty of the game.
1. Bets
A set of eight bets was used. Each bet in the group of eight has
a positive expected value of $.10 (see Table I).
Each bet was paired with all the others and this procedure produced
28 pairs. Each pair of bets was typed on a 3 X 5 card and the 3X5 cards
were shuffled. This deck of 3 X 5 cards, each with a pair of bets typed
on it, the 28 piles of eight cards each, and plenty of poker chips made
up the experimental apparatus.
2. Subjects
The subjects were 12 Monterey Peninsula College students. Four
of the 12 had reservations about gambling and were not tested; another
two of the subjects failed to meet their appointed time; so the total
number of subjects was six.
3. Procedure
The subjects were shown the 28 stacks of cards and told the nature
of the experiment. They were informed that they might lose some of their




BETS USED IN EXPERIMENT I
,02.
.03.
1. If top card is 4, win 1.00; otherwise lose
2. If top card is A or 7, win .50; otherwise lose
3. If top card is 2, 4, 6, win .33; otherwise lose .04.
4. If top card is 2, 4, 7, 8, win .25; otherwise lose .05.
5. If top card is 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, win .20; otherwise lose .07.
6. If top card is anything but 3 or 6, win .17; otherwise lose .10
7. If top card is anything but 5, win .14; otherwise lose .20.
8. If top card is anything, win .10.
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would be required to finish it, regardless of whether they won or lost.
They were also told that the experiment would be biased in their favor
to the extent that they were given a dollar for the session in which no
real gambling took place (the just imagine session).
4. Just Imagine Session
Each subject looked at each of the 28 pairs of bets and reported
which bet he would prefer if he were really gambling but no cards were
used and no money or chips changed hands.
5. Real Gambling Session
Each subject was given $10.00 worth of poker chips at the beginning
of the session. He was required to keep these chips in a box sufficiently
small so that it was not easy for him to estimate during the course of the
experiment how many chips he had. The subjects were discouraged from
counting their chips after verifying that the original count was correct,
but if one insisted, as occasionally happened, he was permitted to do so.
After the subject gave his preference for one of the bets typed on a card,
he overturned the top card of one of the 28 piles. If he won, he was
immediately given his winnings in chips; if he lost, he immediately paid
in chips. After the choice and its outcome were recorded, the subject
proceded to the next pair of bets and again made his choice. They did not
have the option to refuse to gamble on a particular set of bets. At the
end of the session the subjects' chips were counted and the excess over
$10.00 was considered his winnings. If the sum was less than $10.00, the




The data analysis performed are those which are important for
understanding what variables systematically influenced decisions. The
simplest way to treat the data on paired comparisons was to count the
choices of each bet over all the other bets with which it was compared.
These counts were combined for all subjects. Figure I and Table II
present the results of the bets. The relative preference is the number
of times each bet was preferred to the seven others with which it was
compared, divided by the total number of comparisons.
TABLE II
RESULTS FOR THE CONSTANT EV EXPERIMENT









Each number appearing in the table is an index of relative preference for
a bet over all others.
The significant features of this graph are the peak at 4/8, the
valley at 6/8, and the change in slope from just imagining to real gambling
sessions. The peak at 4/8 probably represents a specific preference for
the 4/8 probability; and the valley at 6/8 probably represents a specific
aversion for the 6/8 probability. The slope change probably represents
an increase in the willingness to take chances (long shots rather than















Figure 1 - Results of Experiment I
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The general change in willingness to take chances can be removed
in a rough way by the graphical device of passing a regression line through
each set of points and plotting the deviations from it. Figure II and
Table III show the deviation of each point from its regression line. Once
the difference in slope due to the different experimental conditions is
removed (just imagining vs. real gambling), the agreement among the residual
curves which represents the specific pattern of preferences for some
probabilities over others is much greater than before.
TABLE III
DEVIATIONS FROM REGRESSION LINES FOR CONSTANT EV BETS
Probability Just Imagine Real Gambling
1/8 -.022 -.029
2/8 -.029 -.013
3/8 + .020 + .003
4/8 + .041 + .053
5/8 + .012 + .014
6/8 -.022 -.035
7/8 -.015 -.020
8/8 -.010 + .002
One of the advantages of the method of paired comparisons is that
it does not force the subjects to be consistent. One of the most interest-
ing kinds of inconsistency in this experiment is found when bet A is pre-
ferred to bet B, B is preferred to C, and C is preferred to A. Such a set
of preferences will be called an "inconsistent triad."
Counts were made of all inconsistent triads. Kendall (1948)
offers a statistic based on the number of inconsistent triads called the
coefficient of consistence, which equals one minus the ratio of the number
of inconsistent triads found to the maximum number of inconsistent triads



















Figure 2 - Deviations From Regression Lines for Constant EV Bets
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representing complete consistency. The mean coefficients of consistency
in this experiment were 0.76 for the just-imagine portion and 0.84 for
the real gambling portion. The consistency is fairly high and increased
as the experiment progressed.
Analysis was made of the bets involved in inconsistent triads.
The only interesting result is that the 4/8 probability of winning was
involved in substantially fewer triads than other bets. This finding is
of course consistent with the fact that the 4/8 bet was usually preferred
to all others with which it was compared.
B. DIFFERING EXPECTED VALUE (DEV) EXPERIMENT
In the previous experiment, every choice was between two bets with
the same expected value. Some bets were markedly preferred to others,
even though, since all choices were between bets which had the same
expected value, there was no objective reason for preferring any bet to
any other. For example, those with a 4/8 probability of winning were
especially often chosen, and those with a 6/8 probability of winning were
especially seldom chosen. The results were attributed to the existence
of consistent preferences for some probabilities over others.
In this experiment, every choice was between two bets with different
expected values. What should happen in this experiment? If such phenomena
as preferences among probabilities are ignored, the writer expected the
subjects to chose the bet with the higher expected value. The failure
of subjects to follow this simple expected value maximization strategy
would suggest that something other than expected values was influencing
his behavior, but would not show what. In order to show that probability
preferences were influencing his behavior, it would be desirable to be able
19

to use previous knowledge of probability preferences to predict deviations
from simple expected value maximization. I will examine such deviations
and see whether they can be predicted from probability preferences.
The gambling in this experiment was done with the same seven decks of
cards separated into 28 separate piles of eight cards each. Again each
subject was assured that the top card of each pile was equally likely to
be an A, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8.
1. Bets
Again a set of eight bets was used; only this time, bets that
differed from one another in expected value were used. Table IV reproduces
these bets.
Two criteria were followed in making up the differing expected
value bets "in Table IV. First a bet with a higher probability of winning
was required to pay off less than a bet with a lower probability of winning.
and no bet could involve administratively unreasonable amounts of money.
Secondly, an attempt was made to choose bets with expected values such
that consistent preference of the bet with the higher expected value would
result in a rank ordering of the bets inverse to that found in Experiment I,
Unfortunately, these requirements turned out to be inconsistent with one
another. For example, since the most preferred bet in Experiment I was
the 4/8 bet, the writer chose the 4/8 bet in Experiment II to have the
lowest expected value, which is exactly what he wanted. However, it
was not possible to arrange all the bets in such a manner and still
satisfy the first criterion. Therefore, it was necessary to slightly
compromise the second. Nevertheless, this compromise should not have a





BETS USED IN EXPERIMENT II
1. If the top card is a 4, win 3.00; otherwise lose .14
(EV = .25 per play)
.
2. If the top card is an A or 7, win 1.45; otherwise lose .16
(EV - .24 per play)
3. If the top card is a 2, 4, or 6, win .87; otherwise lose .17
(EV - .22 per play).
4. If the top card is a 2, 4, 7, or 8, win .60; otherwise lose .20
(EV = .20 per play).
5. If the top card is a 2, 3, 5, 7, or 8, win .55; otherwise lose .29
(EV = .23 per play).
6. If the top card is anything but 3 or 6, win .53; otherwise lose .56
(EV - .26 per play).
7. If the top card is anything but 5, win .50; otherwise lose 1.12
(EV = .29 per play)
8. If the top card is anything, win .28 (EV = .28 per play).
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The differing expected value bets were also typed on 3 X 5 cards
in pairs, so there were 28 differing expected value 3X5 cards. The
apparatus used was exactly the same as Experiment I (i.e. the 28 piles of
eight cards each and plenty of poker chips)
.
2. Subjects
The subjects were the same six male students from Monterey
Peninsula College. This sample is hardly representative of any population
in general so generalizations of the findings must be made with caution.
3. Procedure
The procedure was the same as in the real gambling session of
Experiment I. The subjects were told that they could win or lose plenty
of money, and that if they lost, they would have to pay out of their own
money, but that the situation was biased in their favor to the extent of
one dollar a session--each subject was given one dollar more in chips at
the beginning of the session than he was required to return at the end.
The subjects were run individually and never met one another during the
session.
4. Results
Figure III and Table V show the results for the differing expected
value bets, compared with the constant expected value bets of Experiment I,
The Y-axis is the index of relative preference. Again, it is computed by
counting the total number of choices by all subjects of a bet over all
others with which it was compared and dividing by the total number of
choices made by all subjects on all bets. The maximum value this number
can have for any bet is 0.25, which can occur if everyone chooses the bet
22

every time he has a chance. The minimum is 0.00, which can occur only if
the bet is never chosen. The X-axis represents the probability of winning.
These probabilities are arranged in order of decreasing expected value for
the differing expected value bets, so that consistent choice of the bet




RELATIVE PREFERENCE VALUES FOR DIFFERING EV EXPERIMENT
COMPARED WITH THOSE FROM THE CONSTANT EV EXPERIMENT








8/8 .107 . .107
The solid line shows the results for the Differing EV bets; the
dashed line shows the results from the Constant EV bets from Experiment I;
the dot-and-dashed line shows the results which would have been obtained
if all subjects had followed a strategy of expected value maximization on
the Differing EV bets; and the dot-dot-dashed line shows the results which
would have been obtained in the Constant EV experiment if probability
preferences had not influenced the subjects' choices. Clearly, for the
Differing EV bets, there is a general trend downward from left to right,
as the strategy of maximizing expected value would require, but there



















PROBABILITY OF WINNING IN ORDER OF DECREASING EV
Figure 3 - Results of Experiment II
Part A - Curve of CEV Maximization
Part B - Curve of DEV Maximization
Part C - Differing EV Results
Part D - Constant EV Results
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Also, there is evidence that the deviations from maximization of
expected value are related to probability preferences found in the first
experiment. In order to illustrate this point, tabulations were made of
deviations from the curve of expected value maximization for the Constant
EV experiment (the dot-dot-dashed line) and the Differing EV experiment
(the dot-dashed line). Table VI and Figure IV present these tabulations.
TABLE VI
DEVIATIONS FROM EV MAXIMIZATION CURVES
Probability Constant EV Differing EV
1/8 -.011 + .019
2/8 + .000 + .018
3/8 + .012 + .066
4/8 + .059 + .077




Spearman devised a suitable coefficient which measures the correla-
tion between the two curves of Figure IV. This rank correlation coefficient
is .857 which is significant beyond the .995 level in a one-tailed t-test.
In other words, subjects' choices were influenced by expected value
maximization, but the deviations from this strategy can partially be
attributed to probability preferences.
It is clear from the results that subjects do not consistently
prefer bets with higher expected values to bets with lower expected values.
Part of the variation from this simple strategy could have been predicted
by probability preferences.
In these bets, the probability preferences and expected value







































Figure 4 - Deviations From EV Maximization Curves
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had to emerge as the major determinant of choices, but in this case the
expected value differences turned out to be as important as probability
preferences.
It is reasonable to suppose that as the difference in expected
value between two bets, of which the subject must choose one, increases,
it becomes more and more important in determining the subject's choice,
and probability preferences therefore become less important.
27

III. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
The results of Experiment I showed that there are two main factors
determining choices among bets of equal expected value. The first is a
general tendency to prefer or avoid long shots (bets with low probability
of winning or losing and a large amount of win or loss), depending on
experimental conditions. For instance subjects prefer long shots much
more when gambling for real money than when just imagining what they
would do if they were gambling. The second determinant for choices is a
set of specific probabilities. The most important of these are a preference
for a 4/8 probability of winning and an avoidance of a 6/8 probability of
winning.
Subjects made choices in such a fashion that inconsistent triads of
choices appeared a little less than one-fourth the number of times they
could have appeared, and the number of inconsistent triads decreased as
the experiment progressed.
Experiment II was designed to find out what subjects would do when
required to choose between bets with different expected values. The
results showed that both preferences for bets with higher expected values
and preferences among probabilities influence subjects' choices. The
former factor was dominant in those bets with large relative differences
in expected value.
It is unfortunate that probability preferences and differences in
expected value both determine decisions in gambling situations. If expected
value were the only important variable, the wonderful mathematical model
provided by utility theory would predict such decisions. Even so, it might
28

eventually be possible to develop subjective scales of probability (which
would allow for probability preferences). Then the mathematical model
could perhaps be used with these scales to predict risky decisions. The
high correlation between expected value and probability preference differences
in this experiment suggest that an additive model, taking into account an
expected value factor and a probability preference factor, might be used
to predict risky decisions. At any rate, it is a good topic for further











1/8 1 1 1 2 2 1
2/8 2 1 1 2 2 1
3/8 3 4 3 3 3 4
4/8 4 5 3 5 4 6
5/8 4 3 5 4 3 6
6/8 4 4 3 2 5 5
7/8 3 5 6 4 4 4
8/8 7 5 6 6 5 1
Each number in the table is the number of times each probability was




REAL GAMBLING SESSION (CEV)
Probability





1/8 2 4 3 1 4 5
2/8 3 4 3 2 5 4
3/8 4 3 5 3 4 4
4/8 5 6 4 5 6 5
5/8 5 4 4 4 3 4
6/8 4 2 3 3 1 2
7/8 3 1 2 4 3 4
8/8 2 4 4 6 2
Each number in the table is the number of times each probability was




DIFFERING EV SESSION (DEV)
Probability





1/8 3 5 5 4 5 5
2/8 2 4 5 4 • 3 3
3/8 2 3 2 3 3 4
4/8 2 2 1 3 2 3
5/8 3 4 3 3 4 2
6/8 5 3 oj 4 <4 4
7/8 5 5 6 5 5 4
8/8 6 2 3 2 2 3
Each number in the table is the number of times each probability was
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